We prove an N 2−o(1) lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant > 0) in a two-player N × N game.
I. INTRODUCTION
How many bits of communication are needed to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium (for a small constant > 0) in a two-player N × N game? More precisely:
• Alice holds her payoff matrix A ∈ [0, 1] N ×N of some constant precision. • Bob holds his payoff matrix B ∈ [0, 1] N ×N of some constant precision. • Output an -approximate Nash equilibrium: a mixed strategy A for Alice and a mixed strategy B for Bob such that neither player can unilaterally change their strategy and increase their expected payoff by more than . (See Section I-C for a formal definition.) It is well known that such approximate equilibria have a concise O(log 2 N )-bit description: one may assume wlog that A and B are supported on at most O(log N ) actions [1] . There is a trivial upper bound of O(N 2 ) by communicating an entire payoff matrix. Previous work [2] showed that finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium requires N δ bits of communication for a small constant δ > 0. In this work, we improve this to a near-optimal N 2−o(1) lower bound. Our main theorem is slightly more general, as it also applies for games of asymmetric dimensions. Theorem 1. There exists an > 0 such that for any constants a, b > 0 the randomized communication complexity of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an N a × N b game is N a+b−o (1) .
It is interesting to note that there is anÕ(N ) protocol for computing an -correlated equilibrium of an N × N game [3] . Hence our result is the first that separates approximate Nash and correlated equilibrium.
Our result also implies the first near-quadratic lower bound for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in the weaker query complexity model, where the algorithm has black-box oracle access to the payoff matrices (previous work established such lower bounds only against deterministic algorithms [4] ). In this query complexity model, there is anÕ(N )-queries algorithm for computing an -coarse correlated equilibrium of an N × N game [5] . Hence our result is the first that separates approximate Nash and coarse correlated equilibrium in the query complexity model. See Table I for a summary of known bounds 1 .
A. Background
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory. It is named after John Nash who, more than 60 years ago, proved that every game has an equilibrium [6] . Once players are at an equilibrium, they do not have an incentive to deviate. However, Nash's theorem does not explain how the players arrive at an equilibrium in the first place.
Over the last several decades, many dynamics, or procedures by which players in a repeated game update their respective strategies to adapt to other players' strategies, have been proposed since Nash's result (e.g., [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] ). But despite significant effort, we do not know any plausible dynamics that converge even to an approximate Nash equilibrium. It is thus natural to conjecture that there are no such dynamics. However, one has to be careful about defining "plausible" dynamics. The first example of dynamics we consider implausible, are "players agree a priori on a Nash equilibrium". The uncoupled dynamics model proposed by Hart and Mas-Collel [10] rules out such trivialities by requiring that a player's strategy depends only on her own utility function and the history of other players' actions. Another example of implausible dynamics that converge to a Nash equilibrium are exhaustive search dynamics that enumerate over the entire search space. (Exhaustive search dynamics can converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium in finite time by enumerating over an -net of the search space.) We thus consider a second natural desideratum, which is that dynamics should converge (much) faster than exhaustive search. Note that the two restrictions (uncoupled-ness and fast convergence) are still very minimal-it is still easy to come up with dynamics that satisfy both and yet do not plausibly expect to predict players' behavior. But, since we are after an impossibility result, it is fair to say that if we can rule out any dynamics that satisfy these two restrictions and converge to a Nash equilibrium, we have strong evidence against any plausible dynamics.
A beautiful observation by Conitzer and Sandholm [12] and Hart and Mansour [13] is that the communication complexity of computing an (approximate) Nash equilibrium, in the natural setting where each player knows her own utility function, precisely captures (up to a logarithmic factor) the number of rounds for an arbitrary uncoupled dynamics to converge to an (approximate) Nash equilibrium. Thus the question of ruling out plausible dynamics is reduced to the question of proving lower bounds on communication complexity. There are also other good reasons to study the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria; see e.g. [14] .
B. Related work
The problem of computing (approximate) Nash equilibrium has been studied extensively, mostly in three models: communication complexity, query complexity, and computational complexity.
Communication complexity.: The study of the communication complexity of Nash equilibria was initiated by Conitzer and Sandholm [12] who proved a quadratic lower on the communication complexity of deciding whether a game has a pure equilibrium, even for zero-one payoff (note that for pure equilibrium this also rules out any more efficient approximation). Hart and Mansour [13] proved exponential lower bounds for pure and exact mixed Nash equilibrium in n-player games. Roughgarden and Weinstein [15] proved communication complexity lower bounds on the related problem of finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point (on a grid). In [2] , in addition to the lower bound for two-player game which we improved, there is also an exponential lower bound for n-player games. The same paper also posed the open problem of settling the communication complexity of approximate correlated equilibrium in twoplayer games; partial progress has been made by [16] , [17] , but to date the problem of determining the communication complexity of -approximate correlated equilibrium remains open (even at the granularity of poly(N ) vs polylog(N )). Babichenko et al. [18] prove communication complexity lower bounds for finding a pure equilibrium in the restricted class of potential games. On the algorithmic side, Czumaj et al. [19] gave a polylogarithmic protocol for computing a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games, improving upon [20] .
Query complexity.:
In the query complexity model, the algorithm has black-box oracle access to the payoff matrix of each player. Notice that this model is strictly weaker than the communication complexity model (hence our communication lower bound applies to this model as well). For the deterministic query complexity of -approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games, Fearnley et al. [21] proved a linear lower bound, which was subsequently improved to (tight) quadratic by Fearnley and Savani [4] . For randomized algorithms, the only previous lower bound was Ω(1/ 2 ), also by [4] ; notice that this is only interesting for = o (1) . As mentioned earlier, Goldberg and Roth [5] can find an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium withÕ(N ) queries (two-player N × N game) orÕ(n) queries (n-player game with two actions per player). In the latter regime of n-player and two action per player, a long sequence of works [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] eventually established an 2 Ω(n) lower bound on the query complexity of -approximate Nash equilibrium. (This last result is implied by and was the starting point for the exponential query complexity lower bound in [2] ). Finally, some of the aforementioned results are inspired by a query complexity lower bound for approximate fixed point due to Hirsch et al. [26] and its adaptation to 2 -norm in [25] ; this construction will also be the starting point of our reduction.
Computational complexity.: For computational complexity, the problem of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is PPAD-complete [27] , [28] . Following a sequence of improvements [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , we know that a 0.3393-approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. But there exists some constant > 0, such that assuming the "Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) for PPAD", computing an -approximate Nash equilibrium requires N log 1−o(1) N time [25] , which is essentially tight by [1] .
C. Definition of -Nash
A two-player game is defined by two utility functions (or payoff matrices) U A , U B : S A × S B → [0, 1]. A mixed strategy for Alice (resp. Bob) is a distribution A (B) over the set of actions S A (S B ). We say that (A, B) is anapproximate Nash equilibrium ( -ANE) if every alternative Alice-strategy A performs at most better than A against Bob's mixed strategy B, and the same holds with roles reversed. Formally, the condition for Alice is
II. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
Our proof follows the high-level approach of [2] ; see also the lecture notes [34] for exposition. The approach of [2] consists of four steps.
1) Query complexity lower bound for the well-known PPAD-complete EOL problem.
Type of equilibrium
Query Complexity Communication Complexity [5] polylog(N )
[Folklore] Table I : Query and communication complexities of approximate equilibria. The oracle query model is more restrictive than the communication model. Nash equilibrium is more restrictive than correlated equilibrium, which is yet more restrictive than coarse correlated equilibrium. Hence the complexity of a problem increases as we move up and left in the table. For all problems there are trivial bounds of Ω(log N ) and O(N 2 ).
2) Lifting of the above into a communication lower bound for a two-party version of EOL. 3) Reduction from EOL to -BFP, a problem of finding an (approximate) Brouwer fixed point. 4) Constructing a hard two-player game that combines problems from both Step 2 and Step 3.
In this paper we improve the result from [2] by optimizing Steps 1, 2, and 4. We outline these improvements below; see the full version [35] for proofs and details.
A. Steps 1-2: Lower bound for End-of-Line
The goal of Steps 1-2 is to obtain a randomized communication lower bound for the END-OF-LINE (or EOL for short) problem: Given an implicitly described graph on [N ] where a special vertex 1 ∈ [N ] is the start vertex of a path, find an end of a path or a non-special start of a path. The following definition is a "template" in that it does not yet specify the protocols Π v .
EOL template
• Input: Alice and Bob receive inputs α and β that implicitly describe successor and predecessor functions S, P :
The goal is to output a vertex v ∈ [N ] such that either − v = 1 and v is a non-source or a sink in G; or − v = 1 and v is a source or a sink in G.
The prior work [2] proved anΩ(N 1/2 ) lower bound for a version of EOL where the Π v had communication cost c := Θ(log N ). The cost parameter c is, surprisingly, very important: later reductions (in Step 4) will incur a blowup in input size-and hence a quantitative reduction in the eventual lower bound-that is exponential in c. (Namely, when constructing payoff matrices in Step 4, the data defining a strategy for Alice will include a c-bit transcript of some Π v .)
In this work, we obtain an optimized lower bound:
There is a family of EOL instances, whose randomized communication complexity isΩ(N ), and where the Π v have constant cost c = O(1).
Note: Since we consider c = O(1), a c-bit transcript of an Π v cannot even name arbitrary log(N )-bit vertices in [N ]. Thus we need to clarify what it means for Π v to "compute" (S(v), P (v)). The formal requirement is that the pair (S(v), P (v)) is some prescribed function of both v and the c-bit transcript Π v (α, β). Concretely, we will fix some bounded-degree host graph H = ([N ], E) independent of (α, β), and define graphs G as subgraphs of H. In other words, for any vertex v there is a fixed short list of potential predecessor and successor vertices. Now we can, for example, let Π v announce S(v) as "the i-th out-neighbor of v in H", which takes only O(1) bits to represent.
As in [2] , our lower bound is obtained by first proving an analogous result for query complexity, and then applying a lifting theorem that escalates the query hardness into communication hardness. A key difference is that instead of a generic lifting theorem [36] , [37] , as used by [2] , we employ a less generic, but quantitatively better one [38] , [39] .
Step 1: Query lower bound.: The query complexity analogue of EOL is defined as follows. We exhibit a bounded-degree host graph H such that any randomized decision tree needs to makeΩ(N ) queries to the input x in order to solve Q-EOL H . Moreover, the lower bound is proved using critical block sensitivity (cbs), a measure introduced by Huynh and Nordström [38] that lower bounds randomized query complexity (among other things); see full version [35] for definitions. It is not hard to prove an Ω(N ) bound for a complete host graph (equipped with successor/predecessor pointers), nor an Ω(N 1/2 ) bound for a bounded-degree host graph (by reducing degrees in the complete graph via binary trees). But to achieve both anΩ(N ) bound and constant degree requires a careful choice of a host graph that has good enough routing properties. Our construction uses butterfly graphs.
Q-EOL
Prior to this work, a near-linear randomized query lower bound was known for a bounded-degree Tseitin problem [39] , a canonical PPA-complete search problem. Since PPAD ⊆ PPA, our new lower bound is qualitatively stronger (also, the proof is more involved).
Step 2: Communication lower bound.: It is generally conjectured that the randomized communication complexity of R • g is characterized by the randomized query complexity of R, provided the gadget g is chosen carefully. This was proved in [37] , but only for a nonconstant-size gadget where Alice's input is Θ(log N ) bits. This is prohibitively large for us, since we seek protocols Π v of constant communication cost. We use instead a more restricted lifting theorem due to [39] (building on [38] ) that works for a constant-size gadget, but can only lift critical block sensitivity bounds.
Lemma 4 ([39]
). There is a fixed gadget g : Σ×Σ → {0, 1} such that for any R ⊆ {0, 1} N × O the randomized communication complexity of R • g is at least Ω(cbs(R)). 
B. Step 3: Reduction to -BFP
By Brouwer's fixed point theorem, any continuous function f : [0, 1] m → [0, 1] m has a fixed point, that is, x * such that f (x * ) = x * . The BFP query problem is to find such a fixed point, given oracle access to f . We will consider the easier -BFP problem, where we merely have to find an x such f (x) is -close to x.
A theorem of [25] reduces Q-EOL to -BFP with m = O(log(N )). For our purposes, there are two downsides to using this theorem. First, it is a reduction between query complexity problems, which seems to undermine the lifting to communication we obtained in Step 2. (This obstacle was already encountered in [15] and resolved in [2] .)
The second issue with [25] 's reduction is that it blows up the search space. We can discretize [0, 1] to obtain a finite search space. But even if the discretization used one bit per coordinate (and in fact we need a large constant number of bits), the dimension m is still larger than log 2 N by yet another constant factor due to the seemingly-unavoidable use of error correcting codes. All in all we have a polynomial blow-up in the size of the search space, and while that was a non-issue for [25] , [2] , it is crucial for our fine-grained result.
Our approach for both obstacles is to postpone dealing with them to Step 4. But for all the magic to happen in Step 4, we need to properly set up some infrastructure before we conclude Step 3. Concretely, without changing the construction of f from [25] , we observe that it can be computed in a way that is "local" in two different ways (we henceforth say that f is doubly-local). Below is an informal description of what this means; see full version [35] for details.
• First, every point x ∈ [0, 1] m corresponds to a vertex v from the host graph of the Q-EOL problem 2 . We observe that in order to compute f (x), one only needs local access to the neighborhood of v of the Q-EOL (actual, not host) graph. A similar sense of locality was used in [2] . • Second, if we only want to compute the i-th coordinate of f (x), we do not even need to know the entire vector x. Rather, it suffices to know x i , the values of x on a random subset of the coordinates, and the local information of the Q-EOL graph described in the previous bullet (including v). This is somewhat reminiscent of the local decoding used in [25] (but our locality is much simpler and does not require any PCP machinery).
Theorem 5 (Q-EOL to -BFP, informal [25] ). There is a reduction from Q-EOL over N vertices to -BFP on a function f :
C. Step 4: Reduction to -Nash
The existence of a Nash equilibrium is typically proved using Brouwer's fixed point theorem. McLennan and Tourky [40] proved the other direction, namely that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a special imitation game implies an existence of a fixed point. Viewed as a reduction from Brouwer fixed point to Nash equilibrium, it turns out to be (roughly) approximation-preserving, and thus extremely useful in recent advances on hardness of approximation of Nash equilibrium in query complexity [41] , [24] , [25] , computational complexity [42] , [25] , and communication complexity [15] , [2] .
In the basic imitation game, we think of Alice's and Bob's action space as [0, 1] m , and define their utility functions as follows. First, Alice chooses x (a) ∈ [0, 1] m that should imitate the x (b) ∈ [0, 1] m chosen by Bob:
Notice that Alice's expected utility decomposes as
where the second term does not depend on Alice's action at all. This significantly simplifies the analysis because we do not need to think about Bob's mixed strategy: in expectation, Alice just tries to get as close as possible to E x (b) . Similarly, Bob's utility function is defined as:
It is not hard to see that in every Nash equilibrium of the game,
For our reduction, we need to make some modifications to the above imitation game. First, observe that Bob's utility must not encode the entire function f -otherwise Bob could find the fixed point (or Nash equilibrium) with zero communication from Alice! Instead, we ask that Alice's action specifies a vertex v (a) , as well as her inputs to the lifting gadgets associated to (edges adjacent to) v (a) . If v (a) is indeed the vertex corresponding to x (a) , Bob can use his own inputs to the lifting gadgets to locally compute f x (a) (this corresponds to the first type of "local").
The second issue is that for our fine-grained reduction, we cannot afford to let Alice's and Bob's actions specify an entire point x ∈ [0, 1] m . Instead, we force the equilibria of the game to be strictly mixed, where each player chooses a small (pseudo-)random subset of coordinates [m]. Then, each player's mixed strategy represents x ∈ [0, 1] m , but each action only specifies its restriction to the corresponding subset of coordinates. By the second type of "local", Bob can locally compute the value of f (x) on the intersection of subsets. Inconveniently, the switch to mixed strategies significantly complicates the analysis: we have to make sure that Alice's mixed strategy is consistent with a single x ∈ [0, 1] m , deal with the fact that in any approximate equilibrium she is only approximately randomizing her selection of subset, etc.
Finally, the ideas above can be combined to give an N 1−o(1) lower bound on the communication complexity (already much stronger than previous work). The bottleneck to improving further is that while we are able to distribute the vector x across the support of Alice's mixed strategy, we cannot do the same with the corresponding vertex v from the EOL graph. The reason is that given just a single action of Alice (not her mixed strategy), Bob must be able to compute his own utility; for that he needs to locally compute f (x) (on some coordinates); and even with the doublylocal property of f , that still requires knowing the entire v. Finally, even with the most succinct encoding, if Alice's action represents an arbitrary vertex, she needs at least N actions. To improve to the desired N 2−o(1) lower bound, we observe that when Bob locally computes his utility he does have another input: his own action. We thus split the encoding of v between Alice's action and Bob's action, enabling us to use an EOL host graph over N 2 vertices. (More generally, for an asymmetric N a × N b game we can split the encoding unevenly.)
